Yes they are integrated into the structure but it’s my shorthand to call them DNR. The Russians still use them mostly as cannon fodder

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Its key to stay vigilant for signs of continued personnel regeneration in occupied Ukraine and vehicle availability in rear staging areas. The Russian command may be an incompetent one, but it is very dangerous. /end

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I remain concerned about the possibility that the Russians are stockpiling long-range missiles (large salvos have not been not fired for a few months now), for future attacks this winter. /20

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Russian losses are high at Avdiivka. Gerasimov and the Russian command are likely to continue to burn resources until he is stopped also by someone internally. The situation is fluid around Avdiivka. /18

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Gerasimov still cannot see that the offensive potential of his force remains deeply degraded. However, the fact that they launched this assault during the UAF counteroffensive suggests they feel confident in their chances. it’s important to check assumptions on potentials. /19

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Gerasimov can look at his spreadsheets and tell himself a (true) story that he will have artillery advantages in the months ahead and may think he has manpower to spare. But spreadsheets don’t fight as @KofmanMichael says /17

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Russian advantages in mass are partially undercut by UAF precision fires, DPICM and ATACM use, deep strikes on logistics, prudent planning, and better ISR. Yet, the quantitative imbalance of available artillery shells will not improve in the near term. /16

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Recent deliveries in artillery munitions from the DPRK and Russian domestic production going up this year and next could make Gerasimov feel confident that he can brute-force his way through this with shells and sacrificing storm z or regular units. /15

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Gerasimov made brigades available for Avdiivka and other locations, Russians rotated some in the south suggesting there is a padding in manpower. I don’t want to over-interpret availability beyond these 4-5 or so brigades yet (10-20k depending on staffing levels) w/o more info.

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So what does this all mean so far? Troubling because the Russians are throwing vehicles and bodies at Avdiivka at great cost. This the largest attack since mid-2022. These methods strain the UAF who are defending well, but face large volumes of Russian fires and assaults. /13

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