With respect to Belarus, a repeat assault on Kyiv makes little sense. An operation to sever supply lines in the west, or to seize the nuclear powerplant by Rivne, may be more feasible, but this would require a much larger force than what RU currently has deployed in Belarus. 19/
Full-scale invasion and national resilience, broadcasted live.
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Russia’s main objective: Donbas
In my view, Donbas remains the primary goal of Russian military operations, so Russian offensives are likely to focus on seizing this territory. I’m skeptical of claims that Russian forces will attempt a much larger-scale offensive involving cities like Kharkiv, Sumy, Kyiv, etc.
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Kreminna battle significance vs. Bakhmut, RU logistics adaptation, and overcoming anecdotalism.
Hence the battle for Kreminna is arguably more significant than Bakhmut. That said there’s been a fair amount of reorganization in RU logistics, and adaptation. I think the conversation on RU logistical problems in general suffers from too much anecdotalism & received wisdom. 15/
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Situation in Bakhmut after Soledar
After Soledar, the situation around Bakhmut increasingly looks precarious for Ukraine, and I wouldn't be surprised if they ultimately withdraw from the city. However, Ukraine has strong defensive lines outside Slovyansk/Kramatorsk while Russia looks ill positioned to sustain momentum.
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Bakhmut: Cost of Attraction and UA Defense
Bakhmut is geographically important, but has developed a degree of sunk cost mentality for both sides. A fair bit of UA defense there seems to consist of TDF, NG, and foreign legion units suggesting UA is trying to manage the impact of attrition on its force availability. 11/
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Russia’s loss of Izyum and Lyman limits Bakhmut gains’ potential
Having lost Izyum and Lyman, RU has no supporting axis of attack into Donetsk from the north, nor have their forces been able to make breakthroughs in the south of Donetsk. Hence gaining Bakhmut, in my view, offers opportunities for RU that they're not positioned to exploit. 12/
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Russian infantry units key to offense, but offensive edge may be blunted by replacements
RU still depends on airborne and naval infantry at key points along the front as the reserve, for counter attacks, and the main assault force. These units backstop mobilized personnel, but seem to have lost some of their offensive edge due to replacements. 9/
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Assessment of Russian defensive strength and offensive potential
How strong the Russian defensive lines are in practice has yet to be truly tested. RU has manpower in quantity now & continues to pull equipment out of storage, but force quality appears relatively low. This limits offensive potential & force employment options. 7/
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Russia doubled forces in Ukraine and shortened front
It's fair to say since October Russia has likely doubled the force deployed in Ukraine, and significantly reduced the length of the front being defended after retreating from Kherson. Force density has therefore increased relative to territory being occupied. 5/
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Russian Defensive Strategy and Battle of Bakhmut
Russia adopted a largely defensive strategy under Surovikin, focusing on force reconstitution, entrenchment, and a strike campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure. Bakhmut was no exception, with the battle largely fought by Wagner PMCs drawn from Russia’s prison system.