24/ Bilokurakyne and Starobilstk). Taking them would logically hinder the Russian defensive organization of the region, and in particular this stop line that runs from Kreminna to Koupiansk. Note that for now, the Ukrainians have difficulty reaching the P66 at one point.

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Let’s now examine the Ukrainian pressure on Svatove. This is indeed a key road hub leading north toward Russia (Lantrativka), south to Kreminna (two parallel routes, including the P 66 to the west), and east toward the rest of the Luhansk Oblast (two routes).

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21/ In the north (hence the importance of Yakovlivka), this allows to again put pressure on Siversk and reduce the Bilohorivka salient, thus easing pressure on Kreminna. In the south, this allows to continue the clearing of Horlivka near Toretsk. The two actions

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17/ So would the current Russian artillery pressure have more results than the Ukrainian resistance? On the contrary, would the latter succeed in inflicting more damage on the aggressor? No one can say.

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18/ Another debate took place on the objective of Bakhmut. Many commentators explained that this objective had no tactical utility and that it was only a matter of prestige, either for the Russians or for Prigozhin, the leader of Wagner.

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15/ Despite everything, I observe a general Russian pressure and fewer and fewer Ukrainian initiatives. Which amounts to asking the initial question of the level of losses: who is causing the most losses to the other?

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13/ Likewise, the Russians who have settled on a vague ledge of terrain west of Svatove have held their position for nearly three months now. We thus note that if urban areas naturally constitute formidable defensive bulwarks,

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12/ Russian tactic. Despite everything, the dominant impression is that of a mutual neutralization. Let us note, however, that the defense has the advantage. The Ukrainians, settled in their positions for months, resist the vast Russian pressure.

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10/ They strike deep into Ukrainian infrastructure and immobilize DSA units not on the front. Similarly, Belarusian maneuvers pin down some units north of Kyiv. All these actions increase tension on the Ukrainian setup, which nevertheless holds.

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9/ A volley of missiles mid-week has visibly affected the electricity distribution for Ukrainians. Regardless of the quality of Kyiv's air defense systems and despite the favorable (and not very credible) announced balances, these successive strikes weaken

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