-Ukrainian morale will be tested with continued RUF attacks against civilian infrastructure…but UKR will persevere.
-UA will slowly grow in capabilities, but a continued maneuver east of the Dnipro River & into RU occupied Donbas will prove to be a much tougher fights. 15/
Full-scale invasion and national resilience, broadcasted live.
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Ukrainian morale tested by RUF attacks but will persevere; east fights tougher
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Russie : soutien accru d’Iran et cibles ukrainiennes
-RU will get more support from Iran, and will incorporate more strategic aircraft with long-range missile launches. -Primary RU focus is continued destruction of UKR infrastructure & the suffering of the Ukrainian people as a strategic objective to gain concessions. 14/
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Phase III achieved key UA military objectives in Bakhmut and Kherson
The start of Phase III in July achieved key UA military operational objectives by early Nov. The battle of Bakhmut in the Donbas & the operational maneuver in Kherson will rank w/ the battles for Kyiv & Mariupol at the start of this war as critical victories for Ukraine. 11/
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The Eastern Fight Was a Slugfest, Not a Stalemate
The fight in the east was not a “stalemate” as many proclaimed. It was a slugfest. RUF tried to regenerate mauled forces & throw them back into the fight. That was foolish. Based on good intel, UAF moved (& maneuvered) to counter RUF & take back land. 10/
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RUF lacked leadership, C2, logistics; UA had all and precision weapons
For an army to make battlefield adjustments requires good leadership, competent C2, maneuver, logistics, high morale. RUF had none of those. UA had all of them. And new precision weapons (HIMARs, M777s) to complement the precision shoulder-fired weapons employed in Phase I. 9/
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Russia’s failed adaptation in Phase II of Ukraine war
In six weeks, RU knew they had to reduce their objectives, shift their force, improve command & control (C2), fix logistics. In my view, this started Phase II (2 April-30 July). Unfortunately, RU could not effectively adapt. 8/
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Russian force size insufficient for Ukraine mission due to multiple failures
While RU had massive force (190k) around UKR border, it wasn’t enough to accomplish the missions they had. Too many large cities to secure, not enuf combat power, dysfunctional logistics, no unity of command, faulty intel, poor leadership. Violations of the POW 7/
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Mark Hertling’s assessment of Russian and Ukrainian forces on first war night
On 2/24 – the first night of the war – I did a twitter on what I thought would happen. That was based on an assessment of RUF (Russian Force) & Ukrainian Army (UA) & things gleaned from intel reports from my time in command of @USArmyEURAF 3/
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Ukraine’s 9-Month War: Phase IV Review and Predictions
Ukraine is 9 months into this fight. They're at the start of a new phase (Phase IV). Let’s review & then look at what may be ahead. In this AAR, I’ll include past descriptions, slides I made at different times, news articles…and predict what we may need to watch. Here goes. 2/
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ISW dénonce rhétorique génocidaire russe
"This rhetoric is openly exterminatory and dehumanizing and calls for the conduct of a genocidal war against the Ukrainian state and its people, which notably has pervaded discourse in the highest levels of the Russian political mainstream," the ISW found.