— 27/ to destroy UKR positions in the area. It is clear, however, that the ongoing fighting in the Kherson pocket is deadly and causing significant human losses. It is established on the UKR side, likely on the RU side, even if there are fewer testimonies.

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26/ Pro-UKR estimates suggest that progress is slow, but this is actually about wearing down RU forces that have advanced too far north of the Dnieper over time. This assertion refers to what RU has been saying for several weeks on the Donetsk front, where the stagnation is said to be intentional.

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The early results are encouraging, even though there is of course no collapse of the RU system. These have slightly receded in the north, allowed a pocket to form around Sukhy Stavok, and contained the southern push toward Posad Pokrovske.

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23/ The offensive on Kherson, which pushed the RU to bring reinforcements into the pocket. The offensive launched this week constitutes the second phase of this operational maneuver, engaging in direct combat against RU positions.

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— 22/ First, with strikes on Russian logistics depots in and behind the pocket, south of the Dnieper. Then by striking crossing points to hinder the link across the river; Finally, with a communication campaign announcing —

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20/ Military Assessment: A few weeks ago, we spoke of initiative and at the time, we indicated that the RU were trying to take it. Some had denied this intention. It must be noted that this week, it is the UKR who have taken the initiative.

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17/ It will be observed in passing that the UKR have successfully carried out several river crossings, a sign of improved capabilities but also of low water levels (late summer) which facilitate passage. Thus, a pocket has been created around Sukhy Stavok. Time will tell if this locality

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15/ chaque zone grise comme sous son contrôle. Ce serait notamment le cas plus à l’est de Potomkyne, (Petrivka et Lyubimivka sont disputés).
Au centre, les UKR auraient le plus avancé à partir de leur tête de pont de Lozove.

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It is possible that the Russians have retreated slightly further south to a new defensive line, the area having become a no man’s land, as is often the case. This is why it is difficult to interpret the statements from both sides, each tending to consider

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12/ remains precarious. In other words, RU logistics to Kherson is heavily weakened, favoring the UKR attack. They have clearly launched several axes of attack. Some have spoken of 12 sectors, we have identified 5 of which three still appear active.

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