RU fires arty barrages, UA withdraws & repositions. RU attempts a RIF with limited tanks/infantry, UA counterattacks. UA ground forces move forward, RU again attacks with arty. RU attempts to occupy cities but can't secure the ground…UA retakes urban ground.12/
Full-scale invasion and national resilience, broadcasted live.
-
Mark Hertling observes Russian inability to reconstitute after Kyiv fight
In watching the battles, I'm also paying attention to the personnel situation in the east & the emerging resistance in the Kherson Oblast. Specifically, after the Kyiv fight, many of us said the RU would not be able to reconstitute. I don't think they have 8/
-
Signal intercepts reveal Russian unit shortages, mutiny, desertions
Signal intercepts provide assessments of poor unit staffing, personnel shortages due to KIA/WIA, refusals by entire units to go into the line, mutiny, desertions, no wages & food, no replacements. A reason for less battlefield damage is RU forces are moving forward? 10/
-
Donbas stalemate after two months of slugfest
IMHO, that may be because they can't…or they won't…attack in force. The Donbas fight has been a slugfest for over 2 months, so an expectation would be advancement on one side or the other. That's not happened. 11/
-
Ukraine’s adaptable leadership, morale, and support despite fatigue
UA has also experienced change: Leadership has proven adaptable
UA gradually receiving more equipment
Supply lines are extended, but still operational
Morale of force still high, but soldiers are fatigued
Support of citizens and allies still solid. 6/ -
Russian playbook Donbas Kherson artillery recon civilians logistics no combined arms
In both the Donbas & Kherson, it appears the RU are following their playbook. 1. Russian Massive Arty barrages
2. Russian Attempts Recon in Force (RIF)
3. Russian targets civilians
4. RU focus on logistics build/regeneration
5. RU lacks Combined Arms Operation action 2/ -
Ukraine adapts tactics: close counterfire, thwart RU, incorporate Western arms
At the same time, UKR is required to slightly adapt their tactics & operational design 1. UA conducts close counterfire fight vs RU arty
2. UA thwarts RU RIF
3. UA incorporating arms & logistics from West
4. UA employs limited Combined Arms capability. 3/ -
Propaganda vs Family Ties: Study Shows TV Trust Over Relatives Unless Contact Maintained
Is propaganda more powerful than family ties? Yes, but… A study by KSE rector and others shows that relatives of s who live in are more willing to trust the TV than eyewitness accounts of their relatives. Unless they continue to stay in touch during the war
-
Russian SPG-9 position under Ukrainian mortar fire in Kharkiv
GeoConfirmed.
— GeoConfirmed (@GeoConfirmed) 20 juin 2022
"Russian SPG-9 position in Kharkiv Oblast, came under Ukrainian mortar fire of the 92nd Mechanized Brigade."
Frame 1: 49.788414, 37.023286 Vasylenkove
Frame 2: 49.840079, 37.043654 Yurchenkove
GeoLocated by @neonhandrail and @5urpher https://t.co/kAPt5VTPgSGeoConfirmed. "Russian SPG-9 position in Kharkiv Oblast, came under Ukrainian mortar fire of the 92nd Mechanized Brigade." Frame 1: 49.788414, 37.023286 Vasylenkove
Frame 2: 49.840079, 37.043654 Yurchenkove GeoLocated by @neonhandrail and @5urpher -
Anecdotes on spring 2021 conscripts: illegal deployment to Ukraine, no stop loss
good question.There are anecdotes on spring 2021 conscripts- some signed up to contract service before( & presumably during) the war. Some coercion was rejected/ignored. Some were sent to Ukraine (illegally) and some got returned. No policy to “stop loss” them that I can see.