Specifically, UA successful attacks on"tactical" targets (Saki,Maisk, Gvardeyskoe) in Crimea, as well as the repeated attacks against RU command posts (like this morning in Melitopal) send a signal: "You (RU) are not safe; we'll attack where we want." 15/ https://
cnn.com/2022/08/17/eur
ope/crimea-explosions-russia-ukraine-intl/index.html
…
Full-scale invasion and national resilience, broadcasted live.
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Ukrainian strikes in Crimea signal safety threat to Russian forces
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Ukraine’s Kherson reinforcement forces Russian defense shift
When UA "reinforced" Kherson – threatening RU supply lines & forces in Crimea – RU was placed on the defense in another mission they were not prepared to conduct. The "attacker" – UA – now has the advantage of choosing where they want to attack & RU must defend more places.12/
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Russian BTGs struggle in Donbas and southern Ukraine
RU poured dozens of Battalion Tactical Groups (BTG) into Donbas. After months, RU gained very little ground in very tough fighting. At the same time, RU attempted to "secure" cities in the south w/ a too-small force. Ukrainians resisted. Those are competing missions. 11/
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Zelenskyy’s Kherson shift stresses Russian forces more
As President Zelenskyy tasked his force to "shift to Kherson" (as he built the force to do it), it creates *competing missions* for both sides…but it places greater stress on RU's forces than Ukraine's. Why? 10/
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Russia’s supply problems: broken logistics, sanctions, and poor leadership
We've all seen RU's "supply problems:" -dysfunctional logistics supply chains
-extended lines of supplies
-poor logistical leadership
-effects of sanctions
-poor regeneration of the force https://
washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/
30/russia-military-logistics-supply-chain/
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Ukraine adapts tactics, coordinates with allies for new forces
At the same time, UKR also adapted. -Coordinating w/ allies for support; generating more will in UKR.
-Changed tactics (active defense, hasty attacks, counter-fire ops, etc)
-Incorporated resistance, special ops, territorial forces; generating new forces. https://
washingtonpost.com/world/2022/08/
16/crimea-depot-explosion-ukraine-russia-dzhankoi/5/
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Russia adapts: reduces goals, pulls back, regenerates force
Mick also perfectly describes how both sides must *adapt* – something critical to campaigns & fighting. -RU reducing operational goals, due to tactical defeats
-RU pulling back in some areas, reducing # of attack axes; attempting to regenerate their force, consolidate gains
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Hertling comments on Ryan’s Ukrainian southern campaign planning analysis
This 25 tweet by my Australian friend MG (ret) Mick Ryan @WarintheFuture is succinct, descriptive of campaign planning & operational art, and a phenomenal discussion of Ukraine's potential plans in the south. Hope Mick doesn't mind, but I'll add a few additional comments. 1/
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Zelenskyy: Russian occupiers destroy homes and sense of home
@ZelenskyyUa
: “Each person has a home space. #Russian occupiers fire at residential buildings with tanks or cover city blocks with artillery, they target missiles at houses to destroy the entire life space, to destroy people’s sense of home.” https://
cutt.ly/eXlQiZL -
User’s tweet: ‘me since 24.02’ linking to another post
me since 24.02 https://
x.com/NightingaleLvi
/NightingaleLviv/status/1559851684909694978
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