28/ engaged, each belligerent seeks to preserve the economy of their forces (Foch's principle) while forcing the other to overconsume theirs. Today, the Ukrainians seem to have regained some freedom of maneuver even if they are ceding some positions.

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27/ a reserve maneuver that will allow, in the spring, the famous counteroffensive everyone is talking about to be conducted. March or April seems early, I've read some mentioning June or July, we'll see. But in these two attrition maneuvers

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25/ their best troops on the frontline, so as not to exhaust themselves too much. Thus, in January, the Russians had pushed along the entire front to force the Ukrainians to scatter. They can no longer do so and are now concentrating on a few points,

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24/ The Ukrainians, for their part, must hold on for several reasons. First of all because a city is a formidable tool that favors defense and thus allows for the maximization of the attrition strategy I mentioned. Above all, the Ukrainians do not seem to have put

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22/ This is what we have been observing for several weeks now. The slow Russian attrition began in early December, and the capture of Yakovlivka opened up many possibilities, as I pointed out as early as Christmas, considering three hypotheses for development:

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17/ More generally, the famous "Russian offensive" is not, unsurprisingly, starting. The talking points have changed: it is now read that it actually began eight weeks ago. We must agree here on what is meant by "offensive."

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Two other tactical objectives also seem to be taking shape: one far to the north, toward Koupiansk: is it only to retake the entire left bank of the Oskil or to cross to flank Koupiansk from behind? The Dvorichna bridge is to be watched.

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14/ west of Berkhivka, so as to cap all of Bakhmut but also to threaten the north of Chasiv Yar, which was cleared this week by the Ukrainians. Time will tell if this option is being played out (I clarify: hypothesis and not prediction, some do not make the distinction).

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12/ Military assessment. The Ukrainians are succeeding in their gamble: to hold Bakhmout until February 24th so as not to grant Putin a symbolic victory. They have made the necessary efforts, even launching localized attacks this week.

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13/ at this or that point in the sector to delay the capture of the city. Nevertheless, the nibbling continues and the Russian push north of the city makes its fall a little more inevitable. It is interesting to note here that the Russians seem to want to advance on the heights,

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