Ukrainian journalist kidnapped in Kherson Oblast's occupied Nova Kakhovka. Oleksandr Gunko is the chief editor of Nova Kakhovka City media, which had received a proposal from the Russian occupiers to cover events “correctly.” Source: National Union of Journalists of Ukraine.
Full-scale invasion and national resilience, broadcasted live.
-
GeoConfirmed: LPR Militia sweeping Rubezhnoye outskirts with ex-Ukr T-64 tanks
GeoConfirmed.
— GeoConfirmed (@GeoConfirmed) 3 avril 2022
"#LPR Militia sweeping the #Rubezhnoye outskirts…they're using ex-Ukr T-64 tanks"
From 0:09 onwards = 49.026184, 38.359257
GeoLocated by @gfusfus#UkraineInvasion#UkraineRussianWar https://t.co/sIRWj0cVGqGeoConfirmed. "#LPR Militia sweeping the #Rubezhnoye outskirts…they're using ex-Ukr T-64 tanks" From 0:09 onwards = 49.026184, 38.359257 GeoLocated by @gfusfus #UkraineInvasion
#UkraineRussianWar -
Russian armor moving from Kalinkovichi to Minsk (translated)
GeoConfirmed.
— GeoConfirmed (@GeoConfirmed) 3 avril 2022
"Russian armor going from #Kalinkovichi – > #Minsk"
53.206063, 29.072090
GeoLocated by @doppelot #UkraineInvasion#UkraineRussianWar https://t.co/rW7TYtLXP7GeoConfirmed. "Russian armor going from #Kalinkovichi – > #Minsk" 53.206063, 29.072090 GeoLocated by @doppelot #UkraineInvasion
#UkraineRussianWar -
Captured equipment not immediately deployable for Ukraine
I’m sure some folks will say – but Ukraine has captured a lot of equipment. On paper, yes, but it’s going to be a while before this kit is serviceable, manned, and deployed where it makes a tangible difference. A few captured tanks or IFVs do not an armored brigade make. 21/
-
Ukraine’s favorable position in prolonged attrition war depends on multiple factors
Beyond the current battle in the Donbas, if this eventually becomes a prolonged war of attrition, Ukraine seems overall in a more favorable position, but I think the honest answer is 'it depends.' That's my unsatisfactory conclusion thus far.
-
Putin’s war declaration would alter Russian manpower and materiel calculations
However, if Putin chooses to declare a state of war, conduct national mobilization, the situation becomes a lot more complicated. In that case, Russian manpower and materiel availability would be subject to a decidedly different set of calculations. 18/
-
Ukraine seeks Soviet-era equipment for counteroffensives
Conversely, Ukraine will require ammunition and additional equipment to replace losses and equip reserves. It needs mechanized equipment for counteroffensives. ATGMs and MANPADS alone won’t suffice. Hence the request for Soviet-era equipment from countries that possess such inventories.
-
Russia limited without mobilization, can’t quickly reinforce beyond Donbas
In short, Russia can get more battalions, but without a national mobilization its ability to pursue the war beyond the Donbas looks very circumspect. And it can’t get more units quickly. Right now, the Russian mil has to fight largely with what it has managed to put together. 16/
-
Russia’s political choice between long war and special operation
If the Russian leadership wants to continue this war it has to make a significant political choice. They cannot sustain a long war against Ukraine as a special operation, and they don’t want to reframe it as a war. This has implications for force availability. 2/
-
Russian force availability and long-term prospects after casualties
Follow up thread on Russian force availability and long-term prospects. The Russian military has taken significant casualties. After redeploying, and pulling additional units from standing formations, it may be tapped out of available forces, for now. Thread 1/
