In recent months Russian forces have not advanced significantly near Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, Kupyansk. Much of the Russian progress has been around Velyka Novosilka, Kurakhove, and Kursk. However, in Kursk AFU has been forced to withdraw from most of the territory held. /14

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Recent Russian advances in Kursk were taking place well before the suspension of US military assistance/intelligence. The battlefield geometry of a salient was inherently unfavorable. Russian forces chipped away at Kursk until they could interdict the few resupply routes. /15

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Ukraine has thankfully suspended creating new brigades, reversing what was one of the more puzzling force management choices in 2024. And there is progress being made to stand up new Corps formations, which are closer to divisions, based on the AFU’s best brigades. /13

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Ukraine continues to face a structural deficit of manpower as its leading problem. Mobilization efforts remain insufficient to address these challenges and the significant problem of absent without leave (AWOL) personnel. While the amnesty law has prompted some to return to their units, AWOLs continue to weaken the force.

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The recent appointments of a new commanders, especially Drapatyi taking over both Land Forces and OSUV Khortytsia, has had positive effect on the morale of subordinate units. In May 2024 Drapatyi took over defense of Kharkiv on the second day, stabilizing the situation. /10

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Training reform is finally being tackled, and there are prospects for change under the new Land Forces commander, improving the quality of training, facilities, updating the content, replacing instructors, and tying training to actual combat needs. /11

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Ukraine received significant amounts of arty ammunition and equipment over the winter, and increased its own production of drones. Across much of the front there is relative parity in artillery fires and strike drones with some asymmetries in specific categories of systems. 9/

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Drones are responsible for over ~60% of the daily RF casualties at this point, and are the principal means of stopping attacks in combination with mining, and traditional artillery. Better integration has led to a more systemic approach at the tactical level. 6/

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Ukraine invested in this approach last year by significantly expanding drone units such as Birds of Madyar, Lasar Group, Achilles, etc. It also invested in scaling up mine and drone production. Drone formations are the primary stabilizing factor along the front right now. 5/

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AFU is successfully attriting Russian forces at 0-30km through a combination of mining, drones, and traditional fires. This enables a low density of forces to hold the front. Russian units often don’t reach defensive positions and much of the equipment is lost in assaults. 4/

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